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contract, and hence required the presentment or filing of a 
rJaim. In Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 713 [221 P.2d 9], the 
complaint had countR on contract and tort involving the same 
transaction. Plaintiff attached and it was held that he was 
estopped to rely upon the action in tort. Similarly, here 
plaintiff attached the bank account of Wellins indicating 
reliance upon a contract debt rather than a claim to specific 
property as the beneficiary of a constructive trust. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 
1953. 
[L. A. No. 22537. In Bank. May 15, 1953.] 
NAOMI S. 'fALLEY et al., Appellants, v. NORTHERN SAN 
DIEGO COUN'fY HOSPITAL DISTRICT (a Corpora-
tion) , Respondent. 
[1] Pleading-Admissions.-For purpose of testing a question of 
law, all facts well pleaded are admitted. 
[2] !d.-Facts Judicially Noticed.-Facts of which judicial notice 
may be taken will be considered by court, although not pleaded, 
for purpose of testing a question of law. 
[3] State of California-Actions Against.-When acting in its 
governmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued, except 
where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by con-
stitutional or statutory law. 
[4] !d.-Tort Liability.-Doctrine of sovereign nonliability for 
tort applies to state subdivisions only where they are acting in 
a governmental capacity in discharge of official duties. 
[5] !d.-Tort Liability.-Where the state engages in industrial or 
business enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental 
activities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pur-
suant to the consent statute. (Gov. Code, § 16041.) 
[3] See· Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
States, Territories and Dependencies, § 91 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 138; [2] Pleading, § 13; 
[3, 15] State of California, § 67; [4, 5] State of California, §57; 
[6] Hospitals,§ 1; [7-10] Hospitals,§ 8; [11-14] Hospitals,§ 5.1. 
41 C.2d-2 
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[6] Hospital~Character.-~Although county hospitals are admin-
istered by county boards of supervisors while hospitals oper-
ated by local hospital districts are administered by boards of 
directors, both are governmental agencies. 
[7] Id.-Tort Liability.-County hospitals exercise governmental 
functions and counties are not liable for the negligence of em-
ployees toward patients therein. 
[8] Id.-Tort Liability-What are Governmental Functions.-The 
imposition of a charge for service by a hospital operated by a 
local hospital district is not inconsistent with the exercise of a 
governmental function. 
[9] Id.-Tort Liability-Governmental or Proprietary Nature of 
Acts.-The profit or nonprofit phase of the activity engaged in 
by a hospital operated by a local hospital district is not de-
terminative of either a proprietary or governmental function. 
[10] Id.-Tort Liability-Governmental or Propriet.ary Nature of 
Acts.-The test for determining the governmental or pro-
prietary nature of acts of a hospital operated by a local hos-
pital district is whether the particular activity in which such 
governmental agency is engaged at the time of the injury is 
of a public or a private nature. 
[11] !d.-Hospital Districts-Purpose of Statute.-Primary pur-
pose of Local Hospital District Law (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 32000 et seq.) is to fulfill function of protecting public health 
and welfare by furnishing hospital services in areas where hos-
pital facilities are inadequate. 
[12] !d.-Hospital Districts-Promotion of Health and General 
Welfare.-While the health and general welfare of the citizens 
of a county may be promoted by the availability of a county 
hospital regardless of the ability to pay, the health and general 
welfare of the citizens of a district are likewise promoted by 
the availability of such a hospital within the district. 
[13] !d.-Hospital Districts-Validity of Statute.-In the exercise 
of its police power the state may act to provide for the public 
health and welfare, and this in essence is what the Local Hos-
pital District Law was designed to accomplish. 
[14] !d.-Hospital Districts-Right to Sue and be Sued.-Provision 
of Health & Sa£. Code, § 32121, that a hospital district has 
the power "to sue and be sued in all courts and places and in all 
actions and proceedings whatever" merely means that the dis-
trict is authorized to appear as a party to an action where it 
otherwise would be entitled to prosecute such an. action or 
otherwise be liable to answer in damages; it does not enlarge 
the liability of the district. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Hospitals and Asylums, § 9; Am.Jur., Hospitals 
and Asylums, § 12 et seq. 
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[15] State of Californiar-Actions Against.-Whether the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity to suit should be modified is a legislative 
question. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries suffered by hospital patient. 
Judgment for defendant on sustaining demurrer to amended 
eomplaint without leave to amend, affirmed. 
David S. Casey for Appellants. 
Belli, Ashe & Pinney and Renetzky & Davis, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellants. 
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye and Ward W. Waddell, Jr., for 
Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the 
defendant in an action to recover damages for personal in-
juries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the 
defendant's agents in caring for the plaintiff while she was 
a patient at the defendant's hospital. Judgment was entered 
upon the sustaining of a demurrer on the ground that the 
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. The 
court took judicial notice of the fact that the defendant is 
a local hospital district, organized under section 32000 et seq. 
of the Health and Safety Code, and applied the rule that 
a hospital performing a governmental function is not liable 
for personal injuries suffered ·oy patients as a result of the 
negligence of its employees. 
The amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was ad-
mitted to the defendant's hospital for the purpose of de-
livering her of a child; that while she was in a state of un-
consciousness brought about by the use of an anaesthetic the 
defendant and its agents allowed her body and legs to become 
burned by the negligent use of hot water bottles; that as 
a result she suffered serious and permanent injuries; that 
the defendant's hospital was "open to the public as a hospital 
where a person, for a money consideration, could obtain 
hospital and medical serviees"; that the plaintiff was accepted 
as a patient ''for a money consideration . . . and became in-
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debted and was given a bill for services rendered'' by the 
defendant. 
[1] For the purpose of testing a question of law all facts 
well pleaded are of course admitted. [2] Additional facts of 
which judicial notice may be taken will also be considered 
by the court although not pleaded. (French v. Senate of 
Calif., 146 Cal. 604, 608 [80 P. 1031, 2 Ann.Cas. 756, 69 
L.R.A. 556]; Mullan v. State, 114 Cal. 578, 581 [46 P. 670, 
34 L.R.A. 262) .) The defendant hospital district was or-
ganized under the provisions of the Local Hospital District 
Law (Stats. 1945, ch. 932, p. 1738; §§ 32000 et seq., Health 
& Saf. Code). The question presented is whether that 
statute has created an agency immune from liability in tort 
for the negligence of its agents. 
[3] It is generally recognized that when acting in its 
govenmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued except 
where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by 
constitutional or statutory law. (People v. Superior Court, 
29 Cal.2d 754, 756 [178 P.2d 1] .) The plaintiffs contend 
that a statutory departure from the doctrine has been brought 
about in this state. 
In 1893 (Stats. 1893, p. 57) the Legislature enacted its 
first general statute providing for suits against the state. 
The rule is expressed today by section 16041 of the Govern-
ment Code ( Stats. 1945, p. 511) as follows : "Any person 
who has a claim against the State (1) on express contract, 
(2) for negligence, or (3) for the taking or damaging of 
private property for public use within the meaning of Section 
14 of Article I of the Constitution, shall present the claim 
to the board in accordance with Section 16021. If the claim 
is rejected or disallowed by the board, the claimant may bring 
an action against the State on the claim and prosecute it to 
a final judgment, subject to the conditions prescribed by 
this chapter.'' 
In Chapman v. State (1894), 104 Cal. 690 [38 P. 457, 
43 Am.St.Rep. 158), recovery was sought for a loss alleged 
to have been due to the negligence of the Harbor Commis-
sioners in maintaining a wharf. The facts involved occurred 
prior to the enactment of 1893. The court refused to apply 
the act retroactively to create any liability against the state 
for past negligence, leaving open the question of the pros-
pective effect of tortious acts of officers of the state. The 
court concluded, however, that a contractual liability existed 
prior to the act of 1893 and allowed the plaintiff to recover 
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his loss in the action as an additional remedy given by the 
statute. The rule of the Chapman case with regard to tortious 
actions was followed in Melvin v. State (1898), 121 Cal. 16 
[53 P. 416], again involving facts prior to the enactment 
of 1893. Denning v. State ( 1899), 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000], 
directly presented the question of the state's prospective 
tortious liability under the act. Without noting the problem 
left open in prior cases, the court applied the language of 
the Chapman and Melvin cases as holding that the act of 
1893 ''did not create any liability or cause of action against 
the state where none existed before, but merely gave an 
additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have 
existed if the statute had not been enacted." 
In reviewing the foregoing line of decisions, this court in 
People v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1], 
stated: ''Thus there was adopted in this state the doctrine 
that state consent to be sued for negligence did not waive 
sovereign immunity from liability for tort.'' 
Prior to the enactment of 1893 the court was confronted 
with a statute authorizing the commencement of actions 
against the state for damages resulting from the construction 
of a channel in the American River by a levee commission. 
The court held (Green v. State (1887), 73 Cal 29 [11 P. 602, 
14 P. 610]) that the statute did not waive any legal defense 
except that of immunity from suit. Thus, where the state 
was engaged in a public work for the common good, that is, 
in a governmental activity as distinguished from a commer-
cial enterprise, the former constituted a defense to the action 
authorized by the statute. 
In Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16 [53 P. 416], in deny-
ing the retroactive application of the act of 1893, the court 
pointed out that the state was engaged in a governmental 
activity. In Denning v. State, supra, 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000], 
in denying the prospective application of the act the court 
noted that the plaintiff was employed by the state in a 
governmental activity at the time of his injury. [4] Follow-
ing these decisions it was generally held that the doctrine 
of sovereign nonliability for tort applied to state subdivisions 
but only where they were acting in a governmental capacity 
in the discharge of official duties. (People v. Superior Court, 
supra, 29 Cal.2d 754, 760 [178 P.2d 1]; Nissen v. Cordua 
Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542 [269 P. 171]; Kellar v. City of Los 
Angeles, 179 Cal. 605 [178 P. 505] ; Davoust v. City of Ala-
meda, 149 Cal. 69, 70 [84 P. 760, 9 Ann.Cas. 847, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 
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536] ; Madison v. City & County of Ban F'ranC?:sco, 106 Cal. 
App.2d 232 [234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141] .) [5] On the other 
hand, "where the state engaged in industrial or business 
enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental ac-
tivities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pur-
suant to the consent statute.'' (People v. Superior Court, 
supra, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1]; see, also, Yolo v. Modesto 
Irr. Dist., 216 Cal. 274 [13 P.2d 908] .) 
The defendant hospital district is a public corporation 
(Health & Sa£. Code, § 32001), duly formed as the result 
of the favorable vote of a majority of the voters in the 
district (Health & Saf. Code, § 32003). Although no sec-
tion of the statute specifically declares the purpose for which 
the district is created that purpose is made apparent from 
the statute as a whole. Thus, in section 32125 (powers of a 
local hospital district) it is declared that: "The board of 
directors shall be responsible for the operation of all hos-
pitals owned or leased by the district, according to the best 
interests of the public health. . . . . '' In section 32128 
(Minimum standards of a local hospital district) it is stated 
that ''The rules of the hospital, established by the board of 
directors pursuant to this article, shall include. . . . 5. Such 
limitations with respect to the practice of medicine and sur-
gery in the hospital as the board of directors may find to be 
in the best interests of the public health and welfare. . . . '' 
Section 32129 prohibits the district from rendering any 
professional services, either directly or through persons em-
ployed by the hospital. Professional services may be rendered 
by physicians and surgeons who contract to do so with the 
district, but only on a basis which does not result in any 
profit or gain to the district. Section 32125 provides that 
''In fixing the rates the board shall, insofar as possible 
establish such rates as will permit the hospital to be operated 
upon a self-supporting basis." Section 32200 gives the dis-
trict the right to finance itself by taxation of "real and 
personal property within the district,'' and sections 32201 
et seq. provide means by which an annual tax may be levied 
and collected to support the operations of the district during 
the next ensuing fiscal year. 
It is the contention of the defendant district that it is 
exercising a governmental function under the laws of the 
state; that it is not acting in a proprietary capacity, and 
that as a result it is immune from a suit for personal injuries. 
It is insisted that the same rule should apply to hospitals 
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organized under the provisions of the Local Hospital District 
Law as apply to county hospitals organized and operated 
under section 200 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions ()ode. 
(6] The principal difference between the two appears to be 
that county hospitals are administered by county boards of 
supervisors while hospitals operated by local hospital dis-
tricts are administered by a board of directors. But both 
are governmental agencies. County hospitals may charge 
patients for hospitalization and medical care (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 203.5) ; are supported by taxation (W elf. & Inst. 
Code, § 200); and tend to promote the public health and 
welfare (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203). [7] The cases have 
uniformly held that county hospitals are exercising govern-
mental functions and that the counties are not liable for the 
negligence of employees towards patients therein. (Sher-
bonrne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113 [81 Am.Dec. 151]; Madi-
son v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 106 Cal.App.2d 
232 [234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141] ; Latham v. Santa Clara 
Cottnty Hospital, 104 Cal.App.2d 336 [231 P.2d 513]; Griffin v. 
County of Colusa, 44 Cal.App.2d 915 [113 P.2d 270]; Calkins 
v. Newton, 36 Cal.App.2d 262 [97 P.2d 523].) 
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the present case from 
those dealing with county hospitals on the ground that the 
authority of county hospitals to charge fees is limited to 
those patients otherwise eligible for admission because of 
financial circumstances or the unavailability of other hospital 
facilities (Latham v. Santa Clara County Hospital, supra, 
104 Cal.App.2d 336 [231 P.2d 513]) ; whereas there is no 
limitation on the admission of paying patients to hospitals 
operated by local hospital districts (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 32125). [8] However, any distinction based upon the right 
to charge for hospitalization or medical care is not apparent. 
The imposition of a charge for service is not inconsistent 
with the exercise of a governmental function. (Kellar v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra, 179 Cal. 605 [178 P. 505] ; 
Latha1n v. Santa Clara County Hospital, supra, 104 Cal. 
App.2d 336 [231 P.2d 513]; Calkins v. Newton, S1tpra, 36 
Cal.App.2d 262,267 [97 P.2d 523].) [9] Neither is the profit 
or nonprofit phase of the activity engaged in determinative 
of either a proprietary or a governmental function. (People 
v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1]; cf. 
Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [163 P. 670, 
Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685].) [10] The test is 
whether the particular activity in which the governmental 
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agency is engaged at the time of the injury is of a public 
or a private nature. The agency may be authorized to act 
in both capacities. For example, it has been held that an 
irrigation district, so long as it operates only as an irrigation 
district, is acting in a governmental capacity within the 
meaning of the rule that such agencies are not liable for tort. 
(Nissen v. Cordua Irrigation Distn:ct, supra, 204 Cal. 542 
[269 P. 171]; Whiteman v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 
60 Cal.App. 234 [212 P. 706].) But when it steps aside and 
engages in the business of selling power in a proprietary 
capacity it is liable in tort. (Yolo v. Modesto Irr. Dist., supra, 
216 Cal. 274 [13 P.2d 908]; see, also, Davoust v. City of 
Alameda, supra, 149 Cal. 69 [84 P. 760, 9 Ann.Cas. 847, 5 
L.R.A.N.S. 536] .) 
[11] In the present case the statute does not authorize 
the hospital district to engage in private business. The pri-
mary purpose of the statute is to fulfill the function of 
protecting the public health and welfare by furnishing hos-
pital services in areas where hospital facilities are for some 
reason inadequate, especially in those rural districts where 
hospitals cannot be maintained without extraordinary govern-
mental support. [12] While the health and general welfare of 
the citizens of a county may be promoted by the availability 
of a county hospital regardless of the ability to pay (Calkins 
v. Newton, supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 262, 266 [97 P.2d 523] ), 
it is equally true that the health and general welfare of the 
citizens of a district are promoted by the availability of such 
a hospital within the district. [13] In the exercise of its 
police power the state may act to provide for the public 
health and welfare and this in essence is what the Local 
Hospital District Law was designed to accomplish. 
The plaintiff relies upon Silva v. Providence Hospital of 
Oakland, 14 Cal.2d 762 [97 P.2d 798]. The court held that 
the private charitable hospital there involved was not immune 
from liability in tort for negligent acts of its agents. That 
case has no application where as here the immunity arises 
out of the governmental nature of the activity engaged in by 
a public agency. · 
[14] It is contended that the present action is specifically 
authorized by section 32121 of the Health and Safety Code, 
which provides that ''Each hospital district shall have and 
exercise the following powers . . . (b) To sue and be sued 
in all courts and places and in all actions and proceedings 
whatever. . . . '' This provision of the statute means no more 
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than that the district is authorized to appear as a party to 
an action where it otherwise would be entitled to prosecute 
such an action or otherwise be liable to answer in damages. 
in Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., supra, 204 Cal. 542 [269 
P. 171], it was held that a provision in the California Irri-
gation District Act authorizing the board of an irrigation 
district "to sue, appear and defend" in all courts, actions, 
suits, or proceedings did not enlarge the liability of the dis-
trict and applied only to actions such as a public corporation 
might otherwise be subjected to. 
[15] Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should 
be modified in this state is a legislative question. New York's 
consent statute prior to 1939 was construed by its courts 
not to create a cause of action in favor of a claimant which 
did not theretofore exist, although the state's immunity to 
suit was waived. (Smith v. State of New York, 227 N.Y. 405 
[125 N.E. 841, 13 A.L.R. 1264] .) The rule applied in New 
York was similar to that announced by this court in its early 
beginnings and since consistently adhered to. To impose a 
liability upon the state for the tortious acts of its agents 
committed in the performance of a governmental function, 
the New York Legislature adopted its Court of Claims Act 
in 1939 by which the state waived both its immunity from 
suit and its defense of performing of governmental function. 
The act expressly provides that the state's liability be deter-
mined in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied 
in actions against individuals or private corporations. No such 
legislative change in the law of this state has been made. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Again it is necessary for me to protest the continuance of 
the archaic, outmoded, unfair and discriminatory doctrine of 
governmental immunity blindly followed by the majority in 
this case. As I have heretofore pointed out, and as I will con-
tinue to point out, the reason which ever existed for the rule 
has long since ceased to exist, and when the reason ceases, so 
should the rule (Civ. Code, § 3510). 
Section 32121 of the Health and Safety Code specifically 
provides that ''Each hospital district shall have and exercise 
the following powers: . . . ; (b) To sue and b~ sued in all 
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courts and places and in all actions and proceedings what-
ever. . . . '' (Emphasis added.) A majority of this court holds 
that ''This provision of the statute means no more than that 
the district is authorized to appear as a party to an action 
where it otherwise would be entitled to prosecute such an 
action or otherwise be liable to answer in damages.'' This 
statement m.ay have a meaning known only to the majority, 
but it is held to have no meaning here where the facts show 
that plaintiff, a paying patient, in a hospital run by a local 
hospital district, was badly burned while unconscious, as the 
result of the gross negligence of the employees of the hospital. 
Such a holding is a travesty on justice and should lead every 
ill person to travel as many miles as his, or her, condition per-
mits to find haven in a hospital which will be liable for its 
tortious conduct. 'l'o say that the state was engaged in a 
public work for the common good-that is, in a governmental 
activity as distinguished from a commercial enterprise-is beg-
ging the question. Under that definition, a minister would not 
be liable for tortious conduct; a doctor could never be sued 
for malpractice; a private hospital located conveniently near 
any ill patient would never be liable for injury flowing from 
its negligence; a dentist would not be liable for tortious con-
duct toward his patients. All of these tend to promote the 
public welfare and the public health. The fact that all of 
them engage in their various professions for personal mone-
tary gain, no matter how slight, is not of the least importance 
under the rule stated in the majority opinion where we are 
told that "Neither is the profit or nonprofit phase of the 
activity engaged in determinative of either a proprietary or 
a governmental function'' and that ''The imposition of a 
charge for service is not inconsistent with the exercise of a 
governmental function.'' We are told that the test ''is whether 
the particular activity in which the governmental agency is 
engaged at the time of the injury is of a public or a private 
nature.'' 
Such a hospital as the one here concerned is in direct 
competition with private enterprises of the same character. 
No thinking person could seriously contend, as I have just 
done, that a private hospital, a doctor, a dentist, or even a 
minister; should not be liable for its, or his, or her, torts, and 
yet the majority is so anxious to absolve any governmental 
agency from liability for its torts, that that is the logical out-
come of this perpetuation of an outmoded and archaic theory. 
This is obvious because the only peg on which the entire 
May 1953] TALLEY v. NoRTHERN SAN Dmao HosP. DisT. 43 
[41 C.2d 33; 257 P.2d 22] 
opinion rests is that in organizing such a hospital the state 
has promoted the health and general welfare of citizens in the 
particular community. When a patient enters such a hospital 
as a private patient, under the care of his, or her, own doctor, 
he or she should not be classified with an indigent person re-
ceiving care and aid from the welfare fund of the state if this 
absurd rule of governmental immunity is to go on ad nauseum. 
The government obviously cannot insure the citizen against 
all defects and errors in administration, but there is no reason 
why the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully sustained by 
the citizen, those arising from the torts of governmental officers 
and employees, should be allowed to rest at the door of the 
unfortunate citizen alone. The entire doctrine of governmental 
immunity rests upon a rotten foundation, and professors, 
writers and liberal-minded judges are of the view that it 
should be placed in the judicial garbage can where it belongs. 
(See Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85 [136 P.2d 480] ; 
75 A.L.R. 1196; Brooklyn Law Review, April, 1932, "Should 
the Liability of Municipalities in Tort be Extended to Include 
Injury and Damage Caused in the Negligent Performance of a 
Governmental Function?"; 120 A.L.R. 1376; 54 Harv.L. 
Rev., pp: 437-462, "Mttnicipal Tort Liability in Operation.") 
The majority opinion, in order to achieve its unjust result, 
finds it necessary to go back to 1893, and to cite cases de-
cided in that era. For example, Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 
690 [38 P. 457, 43 Am.St.Rep. 158], was decided in 1894; 
Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16 [53 P. 416], was decided in 1898; 
Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000], was decided in 
1899; Green v. State, 73 Cal. 29 [11 P. 602, 14 P. 610], was 
decided in 1887; Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113 [81 
Am.Dec. 151], was decided in 1862. Apparently it is easier 
and more convenient to adhere to the views held by our early 
predecessors on this court than it is to discard them, old, 
outmoded and outworn as they are, for a doctrine or theory in 
keeping with modern times. So far as a majority of this 
court is concerned, we are living even farther back than the 
horse and buggy days. 
I had thought when People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 
754 [178 P.2d 1], was decided in 1947, that we had begun to 
revamp our ideas. It was said there that "The considerations 
of an asserted subversion of public interests by embarrass-
ments, difficulties and losses, which developed the doctrine of 
nonliability of the sovereign in former times, are no longer 
persuasive in relation to an industrial or business enterprise 
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which by itself may be looked to for the discharge of all 
appropriate demands and expenses growing out of operation.'' 
I find, however, that this court has again reverted to the old, 
archaic theory of sovereign immunity and will continue to 
hold that a governmental agency, no matter how it conducts 
its business, is engaged in its governmental capacity and is, 
therefore, immune from tort liability. I dissented from the 
denial of a hearing in illadison v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 106 Cal.App.2d 232 [234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141], a case 
involving governmental immunity, and I will do so every 
time a majority of this court votes to perpetuate the archaic 
and outmoded doctrine. 
\¥e are told in the majority opinon, that whether the doc-
trine should be modified in this state is a legislative question. 
Under the section of the Health and Safety Code heretofore 
quoted, it is no longer a legislative question. The Legislature 
has already spoken. It has provided that such a district may 
''sue and be sued in all courts and places and in all actions 
and proceedings whatever." It is difficult to imagine language 
which could set forth with more clarity the position already 
taken by the Legislature, and if the majority of this court 
was not so fettered and weighted down by the outmoded 
traditional concept of sovereign immunity it would so hold in 
this case. 
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial 
court to overrule the demurrer and permit the defendant to 
answer if it be so advised. 
